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BRUNEI 
The ASEAN Connection 
Donald E. Weatherbee 
Although no formal mechanism for accession has yet 
been announced, it is expected by Brunei and its future partners that the 
Sultanate will become the sixth member of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1984, after it obtains full sovereignty over its 
external affairs.' The characteristic ASEAN decision-making process of for- 
mal and informal consultations (musyawarah) leading to consensus (mufakat) 
is in full train. Brunei's candidature was announced at the June 1981 annual 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in Manila. Brunei was invited as an 
"observer" and was represented by the Sultan's brother, Prince Mohammad 
Bolkiah, who is the Perdana Wazir and probably will be Brunei's first For- 
eign Minister. In his address to the conference, Prince Mohammad stated 
that it was the hope of Brunei that the question of its membership in 
ASEAN could be favorably resolved once independence was achieved.2 If 
the statements of ASEAN leaders to date are any guide, there would appear 
to be little doubt that when Brunei makes its application, it will be accepted. 
In fact, membership in ASEAN may be the sine qua non of Brunei's indepen- 
dence. 
Brunei's inclusion in ASEAN will mark the first enlargement of the group 
since the original five (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the 
Philippines) signed the Bangkok Declaration in 1967. Brunei is not the only 
potential member. Sri Lanka has openly campaigned for membership, to the 
private distress of ASEAN leadership. Although questions of geographic 
proximity are raised concerning Sri Lanka's would-be ASEAN role, it would 
seem that other considerations are more significant in determining the gen- 
erally negative reactions in ASEAN. Papua New Guinea too is associated 
with ASEAN, but its prospects for full membership, even if it desired, would 
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not seem bright. Brunei as a candidate, however, seems to have all of the 
qualifications. Geographically it is part of the Malaysian-Indonesian core 
area in Southeast Asia. Culturally it is Malay-in Islam, language, and cus- 
toms. Most importantly, the perception in Indonesia and Malaysia is that 
regional security and stability require Brunei's incorporation into the 
ASEAN framework. Brunei's candidate status is primarily a function of 
political necessity, economic and cultural criteria being secondary. 
The country itself is a mini-state with petroleum punch. Once one of the 
greatest of the archipelago Malay states, Brunei's history from the 17th to 
the 19th centuries was one of incremental partition until finally, in 1888, the 
Sultanate, largely confined to its present borders, accepted a British protec- 
torate as the only way to forestall absorption into either Brooke's Sarawak or 
the domains of the North Borneo Company. This was followed in 1904 by 
the appointment of a British Resident to advise the Sultan in all matters 
except Islamic law and Malay custom. The Resident became a High Com- 
missioner under the 1959 Agreement which was amended in 1971 to pro- 
vide for full internal self-government. 
Brunei has a land area of 2,226 square miles not wholly contiguous. The 
northern district of Temburong (503 square miles) is separated from the rest 
of the state by the projection to Brunei Bay of that part of Sarawak's Fifth 
Division known as Limbang. This approximately one thousand square miles 
was grabbed by the second Raja Brooke in 1890, after the protectorate had 
been established. The cession was never acceded to by the Brunei govern- 
ment. The issue was raised in 1967 by Sultan Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin, and 
after his abdication, by his son, the present Sultan, Sir Muda Hassanal Bol- 
kiah, 29th in the line, who forcefully and publicly reasserted Brunei's claim 
to Limbang in a 1970 radio address in which he stated: "Brunei and Lim- 
bang are not separated because Limbang belongs to Brunei."3 Bruneian 
maps do not show any boundary between Brunei and the Limbang district 
of Sarawak. 
Brunei's population according to the 1981 census is only 192,000, some 
34,000 fewer than the 1980 population estimate based on extrapolations 
from the 1971 census figure of 136,000.4 About one-quarter of the popula- 
tion is ethnic Chinese of whom more than 30,000 are stateless. The ex- 
change of notes that accompanied the 1979 Treaty of Cooperation and Friend- 
ship between Britain and Brunei5 detailing independence arrangements 
included an understanding that once British responsibility for British pro- 
tected persons in Brunei is terminated, those who have permanent residence 
in the state will continue to have residence and will be granted International 
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Certificates of Identity for travel purposes. Nevertheless, some unease exists 
in the Chinese community given Brunei's stringent nationality law and limits 
on property rights. Already those who can afford it are emigrating. There has 
been some concern expressed that a post-independence flight of Chinese to 
Singapore might "erode ASEAN's multi-racial cohesiveness."6 On the other 
hand, given Brunei's limited population and continued reliance on immi- 
grant labor, there seems little logic for the adoption of policies that would 
alter arrangements of long standing to the disadvantage of a minority that 
plays a vital role in the economy and labor force. 
The people of Brunei have the highest per capita income in the ASEAN 
region, more than US $11,000 per year. This figure, of course, only illus- 
trates Brunei's relative wealth and small population, not income distribution. 
In a series of five year plans, major investments have been made in a social, 
welfare, and economic infrastructure that has significantly changed Brunei 
society. The current 1980-84 plan calls for expenditure of B $1,700 million, 
more than double the B $760 million in the 1975-79 plan. (The Brunei 
dollar is at par with the Singapore dollar and is worth approximately US 
$.48.) There is some subsidy support for lower prices for food and fuel. 
More showy projects include a new stadium, which will hold a quarter of the 
total population at one seating, and the new royal palace. Brunei's transpor- 
tation and communications links have been extended with the deep water 
port at Muara and a new airport, with a 12,000-foot runway, at Bandar Seri 
Begawan, the capital. Royal Brunei Air operates an expanding number of 
regional routes with Boeing 737s. By the end of 1983, Brunei, which already 
has color television, will have a ground station giving it satellite transmission 
capabilities. Still, Brunei's wealth cannot be absorbed in Brunei and the 
government runs huge annual surpluses larger than annual expenditures. An 
international Investment Advisory Board recommends the foreign invest- 
ment of these surpluses. 
Brunei's wealth is the product of the activities of Brunei Shell Petroleum, 
in which the government of Brunei holds a 50% share of the equity. Since the 
first well started pumping at the Seria field in 1929, BSP has produced nearly 
1.7 million barrels of oil. Its reserves are given as more than 1.6 million 
barrels.7 At current rates of production of about 180,000 barrels per day, this 
is more than a twenty-year reserve. Production is below its highest rate of 
268,000 b/d in 1979. The cuts resulted in a 27% drop in production between 
1980 and 1981. The decision to reduce output seems to have been based on 
both market considerations (the oil glut) and the government's already exist- 
ing huge surplus of revenue. Although Brunei by OPEC standards is a fairly 
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small producer (twenty-third in the world), unlike many petroleum states 
Brunei has no need for current extra income. Many of BSP's offshore fields 
have natural gas associated with oil, and according to BSP this decade will 
be dominated by gas interests. The gas from the offshore wells is pumped to 
the world's largest liquification plant at Lumut, jointly owned by the Brunei 
government, Brunei Shell, and Mitsubishi. More than five million tons of 
liquid natural gas (LNG) a year are exported to Japan on a twenty-year 
contract (through 1992). Brunei is, after Indonesia,Japan's major supplier of 
natural gas. Brunei's gas reserves are estimated to be 109 cubic feet or an 
energy equivalent greater than its oil reserves. 
In 1980, Brunei's total exports were valued at B $9.7 billion, of which oil 
and natural gas accounted for 99%.8 The crude oil exports went to nine 
customers in the following percentages: Japan (59%); Singapore (10.5%); 
United States (10.4%); South Africa (7.8%); Thailand (6.4%o); Philippines 
(1.7%); and Australian and New Zealand each at less than 1%. Although 
Japan continues to be the largest single importer of Brunei crude, its share 
has been declining while the ASEAN share has increased. Furthermore, it 
remains to be seen whether eventual ASEAN and U.N. membership will lead 
to the termination of crude oil sales to South Africa. The value of Brunei's 
oil exports has tripled since 1978, a function of price increases, not volume. 
All exported LNG goes toJapan and in 1980 was worth B $3 billion. 
Brunei has been running ever-increasing balance-of-trade surpluses de- 
spite the necessary importations for the development programs, as Table 1 
demonstrates. For the first three quarters of 1981, the surplus was B $800 
million less than in the comparable period of 1980. This reflects oil produc- 
tion cutbacks. In 1981, Singapore succeededJapan as Brunei's major import 
country of origin, followed byJapan, the U.S., and the United Kingdom. 
It was the issue of Brunei's wealth in the regional setting that led to the 
collapse of an earlier decolonization scheme that would have had Brunei 
-entering the Malaysian Federation with Sabah and Sarawak in 1963. Brunei, 
aware of the offshore oil and gas potential, did not want to turn over to 
Kuala Lumpur at the end of a decade the revenue from the exploitation of 
its mineral resources. It should be remembered that at this time Malaysia's 
own petroleum resources had yet to be explored, so that the question of the 
division of revenue between the central government and the state was impor- 
tant. The differences between the parties have been trivialized as a dispute 
over rank and precedence of the then ruling Brunei Sultan, Sir Omar Ali 
Saifuddin, among the Malay potentates. This interpretation can still rouse 
anger as in late 1981, when Tunku Abdul Rahman, who as the Malaysian 
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TABLE 1 Brunei Imports, Exports, and Balance of Trade (B $) 
Year Imports Exports Trade Balance 
1975 648,856,668 2,494,805,866 1,845,949,198 
1976 642,529,532 3,239,150,975 2,650,621,443 
1977 680,407,559 3,999,976,635 3,319,569,076 
1978 639,246,103 4,195,209,695 3,555,963,592 
1979 862,082,803 5,796,490,159 4,934,407,356 
1980 1,230,595,450 9,852,936,235 8,622,340,785 
S O U R C E: Brunei, Statistics of External Trade 
NOTE: Exports include reexports. 
Prime Minister at the time, almost casually remarked in his Star (Penang) 
newspaper column that the negotiations with Brunei failed because Sir Omar 
wanted to be the Head of State (Yang Dipertuan Agung). The Brunei gov- 
ernment retorted that the reason was that Brunei had not wanted to be a 
tribute-paying dependency of Malaya. Although Sir Omar abdicated in 
1967, he has remained a very influential figure in the state. 
At the same time that Brunei was discussing federation with Kuala Lum- 
pur, traumatic internal political developments occurred. An experiment in 
representative government saw A. M. Azahari's Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB) 
emerge as the dominant popular political force in the state. The PRB's 
leadership differed sharply with the Sultan over Brunei's future (the PRB 
calling for immediate, unilateral independence) and internal constitutional 
arrangements. In December 1962, the PRB rebelled and aided by the Ten- 
tara Nasional Kalimantan Utara (North Kalimantan National Army), with its 
Indonesian connections, briefly seized BSP facilities at Seria. Under the 
terms of the 1959 Agreement, the British quickly intervened and crushed the 
revolt. The Sultan sternly put an end to open politics, banned the PRB, and 
declared a "State of Emergency" that has remained in force through biennial 
renewals. The events of 1962-63 and their aftermath left lasting marks on 
Brunei's politics. It explains in part the great value that the Sultanate placed 
on the British security link (and consequent reluctance to move towards 
independence); the suspicion held in Brunei about the ultimate motives of its 
neighbors; and the absence of democratic institutions. As Brunei moves to 
independence in an ASEAN framework, the kinds of fears which buttressed 
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absolutist isolation are giving way to greater confidence in a Bruneian identi- 
ty in a friendly regional environment. Without ASEAN, it might have been 
different. 
Brunei was set on a course towards independence under the twin pres- 
sures of Malaysian hostility and British policy. The Malaysians directed a 
two-pronged political attack against the Sultanate. They attempted to "de- 
stabilize" the regime through poorly disguised clandestine assistance to the 
exiled and illegal PRB, and at the same time belabored the British in the 
U.N.'s Fourth Committee for its colonialism and had the issue of Brunei's 
independence inscribed on the agenda, despite Brunei's protests. Malaysian 
policy towards Brunei up to the death of Prime Minister Tun-Abdul Razak 
in January 1976 was complicated by personal antagonisms; but more basi- 
cally, it can be argued that Kuala Lumpur had an implicit interest in the long 
run to complete the federation, realistically fearful of the impact of an 
independent Brunei on separatist tendencies in Sarawak and Sabah or the 
possible spill-over effects of politics in Brunei into the politics of East 
Malaysia. The vigor of the Malaysian campaign to change the Brunei status 
quo, together with Malaysia's enthusiastic support for Indonesian interven- 
tion in East Timor, led to some speculation that as a "potential security 
threat," Brunei might become Malaysia's "Timor."9 
The Malaysian pressure on Brunei and in the U.N. was congruent with the 
British government's desire to terminate its semi-colonial role in Southeast 
Asia and, in the framework of the drawdown of its military strength East of 
Suez, reduce its political commitments. As the British tried to hasten negoti- 
ations with the Sultanate over termination of the protectorate to the tempo 
of Malaysian-sponsored U.N. resolutions calling for Bruneian independence 
and self-determination, the sticking issue was security. Brunei's unwilling- 
ness to sever the British tie stemmed in part from its perception of the 
deterrent nature of the physical presence of British military strength chiefly 
represented by the British-officered, thousand-man-strong Gurkha (Nepa- 
lese) battalion based in Seria to defend the oil installations. The Sultanate 
picks up the annual bill of more than B $5 million a year. The Gurkha's 
came in 1962 and have remained, but the 1971 Amended Agreement 
changed the functional security relationship. Article III stated that subject to 
consultation, defense and security were tasks to be shared, but that "internal 
public order" was a matter of concern only to the public security forces of 
the Sultan. In the case of an external threat, the British commitment was 
only one to "consult together to determine what means should separately or 
jointly be taken."10 The actual deployment of the Gurkhas is historically 
conditioned by the events of 1962, which were a matter of internal order 
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then covered by the 1959 Agreement. Their actual military role since 1971 is 
problematical although they might have symbolic value.11 After tough nego- 
tiations it was announced officially on June 30, 1978, that Brunei would 
become fully independent at the end of 1983, assuming complete responsi- 
bility for its own foreign affairs and defense; the Gurkhas are to be with- 
drawn by September 1983. 
Brunei has sought to fill the defense gap by quantitatively and qualitative- 
ly strengthening its own forces. The two battalions of the Royal Brunei 
Malay Regiment, raised in 1961, are to be augmented by a third infantry 
battalion and a prospective composite artillery regiment. As a sweetener to 
the 1978 decision, the British pledged $75 million to reequip the RBMR. 
Actually the British financial contribution is only a small fraction of Brunei's 
defense spending. Although the figures are tightly held, it is estimated that at 
least a third of Brunei's expenditures are on defense. From a level of B $100 
million in 1975, spending reached B $500 million in 1981. In the five years 
1978-82, nearly B $2 billion will have gone to acquire modern weapons 
systems such as the British "Rapier" missiles, fast-attack naval craft carrying 
the French Exocet missiles, helicopter gun ships armed with Swiss 81 mm 
air-to-ground rockets, and Scorpion tanks. Brunei's defense spending as a 
percentage of its budget is the highest in the ASEAN region. 
Even though money might not be any object in Brunei's security plan- 
ning, the demographic reality is that there is a very small human pool from 
which indigenous forces can be drawn. Already the role of women in the 
defense forces is increasing, but the limits to expansion of personnel given 
the other claims on the labor force is a real constraint. One partial solution is 
recruitment of mercenary forces. Today, a substantial part of fixed installa- 
tion security is provided by a privately recruited force of Gurkhas, freeing 
the RBMR soldiers for other duties. Also there remains in Brunei some hope 
that it might still be possible to work out an arrangement that would pro- 
long the presence of the Gurkha battalion or, failing that, to maintain some 
sort of British defense commitment, at least in a general way. The analogy of 
the Five Power Defence Agreement comes to mind. 
The best guarantee of Brunei's security is to be found in the kind of 
international order in which it will become independent. Malaysia was not 
the only interested party in the evolution of Brunei politics. Post-Sukarno 
Indonesia shuddered at the prospect of any kind of radical regime emerging 
in Bandar Seri Begawan and was not particularly happy with Kuala Lum- 
pur's backing of the PRB even if Kuala Lumpur thought it could control the 
outcome. Indonesia would not tolerate any Brunei regime that might be- 
come the base for subversive acts against Indonesia. Nor did Indonesia 
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endorse any kind of Malaysian federation solution to the decolonization 
questionJakarta made it clear to Malaysia at an informal Heads-of-Govern- 
ment meeting at Labuan in May 1978 that Indonesia wanted Brunei to be 
discussed first in the context of regional security and stability. Although 
Indonesia denies any desire to interfere in Bruneian affairs, Indonesia never- 
theless claims to be one of the countries responsible for security in the 
ASEAN area, including Brunei. In this role Jakarta indicated that it was 
prepared to provide training for Brunei security forces in a way "to contrib- 
ute to the creation of a good atmosphere for political development in 
Brunei."12 
From the outset Indonesia has made it plain that its preference was for 
Brunei's inclusion in ASEAN. Reportedly, President Suharto had that mes- 
sage conveyed to the Sultan in June 1978, via Singapore's Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew. Closer ties were forged during the Sultan's "unofficial" visit 
to Jakarta in April 1981. Senior Indonesian officials were quoted as assuring 
Brunei of its support for ASEAN membership, describing the Sultan's visit 
as "very significant in shaping a regional order based on peace, stability, and 
harmonious relations."13 Perhaps with memories of "confrontation" in 
mind, the Sultan was not accompanied by any British advisors on hisJakarta 
trip. Prince Mohammed Bolkieh in his address to the 1981 ASEAN Foreign 
Minister's meeting took special note of the "firm support" given to Brunei's 
ASEAN membership by President Suharto. 
Indonesian sponsorship of Brunei's independence in an ASEAN frame- 
work works to Brunei's advantage diplomatically as it redefines its relation- 
ship with Malaysia in a process that has moved forward surprisingly rapidly 
and positively. It is to the credit of Malaysia's former Prime Minister, Datuk 
Hussein Onn, that past irritations have been resolved. When his government 
took office in 1976, he had not been involved in the events scarring Brunei- 
Malaysian relations. Furthermore, even though Sir Omar had abdicated, 
Datuk Hussein was aware of his continued great influence and sensitive to 
the issues of personal relations. While continuing to press for decoloniza- 
tion, the Malaysian PM sought to establish a viable relationship with Brunei 
based on mutual interest and political equality. The efforts were rewarded 
when Foreign Minister Rithauddin went to Brunei in February 1979, after 
the independence agreement had been signed, to convey Malaysia's desire 
for a new era of friendship with the Sultanate. This was the first official visit 
of a Malaysian federal minister since the 1968 coronation of Sultan Sir 
Muda Hassanal and was viewed in Brunei as "a historic gesture of good- 
will"14 (Hussein Onn, himself, was invited to Brunei for the wedding of the 
Sultan's sister in July 1979). The initial Malaysian "wooing" of Brunei 
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reached its climax when the Sultan traveled to Malaysia inJuly 1980 for the 
installation of the new Yang Dipertuan Agung, his "Polo diplomacy" part- 
ner, the Sultan of Pahang. During this visit, the first in 17 years by a Brunei 
ruler, the Sultan had four days of discussion with Malaysian officials that 
established a satisfactory basis for a pattern of social, economic, and politi- 
cal exchanges that in the space of a few short months made Malaysia an 
important partner of Brunei, not an adversary. 
With respect to inter-Borneo relations, a significant event was the visit to 
Bandar Seri Bagawan in March 1981 by the Sarawak Chief Minister Tan Sri 
Abdul Rahman Yakub. It was described as memorable, opening "a new 
chapter in the history of the two states." 15 It occurred just before Yakub 
stepped down as Chief Minister, but he was accompanied on the visit by his 
designated successor, Datuk Amar Taib Muhammad, formerly Federal Ter- 
ritory Minister in the central government. The Yakub visit marked the end 
of an era of official hostility between Brunei and Sarawak that began in 
1970, when Yakub, the newly named Chief Minister, scornfully rejected the 
Limbang claim, after which Brunei cut off Sarawak's overland connection to 
the district. 
The Malaysian ring was closed with an exchange of visits between Sa- 
bah's Chief Minister, Datuk Harris Salleh, and the Brunei Sultan. Datuk 
Harris attended the thirty-fifth birthday celebration for the Sultan in August 
1981. This visit was reciprocated by the first official visit of a Brunei Sultan 
to a Malaysian state the next month. More informal relations with Sabah's 
Chief Minister exist in the form of business enterprises in which both the 
Brunei royal family and the Sabah leader have interests. The symbol of 
Borneo reconciliation may be seen in the "Friendship Road," which will be, 
when completed, the first road through Brunei, linking Sarawak and Sabah. 
The road is, according to Sabah's Datuk Harris, an example of East Malaysia 
and Brunei assisting each other, "in the spirit of ASEAN."' 6 
A series of Malaysia-Brunei technical and administrative exchanges 
through 1981 and into 1982 laid the base for the March 1982 visit to Brunei 
of Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam. The two states finalized 
agreements on cooperation in a number of fields. Musa told his Brunei hosts 
of Malaysia's "keenness to see Brunei joining the community of nations, 
particularly ASEAN, as well as the Islamic Conference Organization. "17 Ma- 
laysia will give facilities for the administrative training of Brunei officials and 
hold open more places in Malaysian tertiary education institutions for Brun- 
eian students. Defense cooperation seems to be envisaged as well. Brunei's 
acting Menteri Besar Pehin Haji Abdul Aziz and his team spent ten days in 
Kuala Lumpur in January 1982 to discuss, among other items, Malaysian 
732 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXIII, NO. 6, JUNE 1983 
assistance in training Brunei forces. Already a RBMR goodwill visit has been 
made to Sarawak, and joint naval exercises in the South China Sea are 
scheduled. 
The developing network of Malaysia-Brunei modern economic, political, 
and social ties is based on a foundation of shared cultural, linguistic, and 
religious values. With such underpinnings, Malaysia bids well to replace 
Singapore as Brunei's unofficial mentor in ASEAN. The Singapore relation- 
ship has been very important. It gave Brunei a regional window that, next to 
London, provided access to the world. Singapore is an important site for the 
training of Brunei civilian and military personnel, and is Brunei's trade entre- 
pot. A substantial part of Brunei's surplus wealth is invested in and through 
Singapore. There is also the security link. A Singapore Armed Forces infan- 
try or artillery battalion is regularly rotated through Brunei for jungle train- 
ing in Temburong District. The public record does not show whether the 
Singapore battalion has a defense function for Brunei, but it is instructive 
that plans for the third RBMR infantry battalion call for it to be based in 
Temburong. It is problematical whether Singapore Armed Forces will be 
able to operate in the future in Brunei given Malaysian (and perhaps Indone- 
slan) reservations. 
Both Singapore and Malaysia have been involved in tutoring Brunei in 
ASEAN and world affairs. The 1981 Singapore U.N. delegation had a Brun- 
eian attached to it while Malaysia's delegation to the 1981 Commonwealth 
Heads of Government Meeting included a Bruneian. Singapore conducted a 
special seminar on the workings of ASEAN for Brunei in September 1981, 
and the Brunei Agency in Singapore is the basis for future diplomatic repre- 
sentation. Malaysia and Brunei have exchanged Representative Offices hav- 
ing diplomatic status, and Brunei has a rice-purchasing mission in Bangkok. 
In April 1981, the Thai Deputy Foreign Minister made the first high-level 
official Thai visit to Bandar Seri Begawan. "As far as Thailand is concerned," 
he said, "we will be happy if Brunei joins ASEAN and takes part in its 
activities after it becomes independent."'18 Current planning suggests that in 
addition to London, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore, diplomatic missions will 
be opened inJapan and the United States. As in all other areas of administra- 
tive services, foreign affairs staffing will be a problem with senior officials 
doing double or triple duty. This is an area in which recruitment of expatri- 
ates is no solution. 
A possible first legal step towards ASEAN membership for an indepen- 
dent Brunei would appear to be accession to the 1976 Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia adopted by the ASEAN states at the Bali 
Summit. The treaty provides for the pacific settlement of disputes among 
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the contracting parties and is open for accession by other states in Southeast 
Asia.19 Theoretically, a Southeast Asian state could become a party to the 
treaty without becoming a member of ASEAN-indeed, this provision was 
designed with Vietnam in mind. It is doubtful, however, that ASEAN mem- 
bership would be granted to a non-signatory state. Brunei's accession to the 
treaty would bring it within an emerging legal regime in Southeast Asia in 
which the signatories have pledged that they "shall not in any manner or 
form participate in any activity which shall constitute a threat to the political 
and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of another High 
Contracting Party" (Article 10). Such a regime would certainly provide a 
normative framework responsive to Brunei's security concerns while the 
political dynamic of ASEAN "concord" and "solidarity" gives policy sub- 
stance to peaceful relations among ASEAN states. In one sense it could be 
said that Brunei's emergence as a fully independent member of ASEAN in 
1984 will be one of the fruits of the ASEAN political community whose 
charter was laid down at the Bali Summit. 
The progress made in integrating Brunei into the regional system does not 
mean that all problems are solved. Stumbling blocks still remain in the 
bilateral Malaysia-Brunei relationship, but these have not been allowed to 
interfere with the development of the rapprochement. The question of the 
Limbang claim immediately comes to mind, since this has not been aban- 
doned by Brunei. The existence of the claim in itself should not be disrup- 
tive so long as neither party wishes to make an issue of it. But there is some 
feeling on the Malaysian side that the termination of the Limbang claim 
would have felicitous consequences in relation to the protracted dispute 
with the Philippines over sovereignty in Sabah. A second potential area of 
dispute between Brunei and Malaysia lies in the demarcation of their respec- 
tive continental shelves. Malaysia's map of its continental shelf, gazetted in 
December 1979, ignores Brunei's shelf proclaimed in 1954. The Malaysian 
claim treats the shelf as uninterrupted from Sabah to Sarawak-i.e., as 
though Brunei did not exist. The question of the boundaries has been raised 
by Brunei through London, but Malaysia has indicated that this is an issue 
for independent Brunei. There is no evidence that the issue of the Limbang 
claim and Malaysian maritime jurisdiction have been connected. A possible 
future problem of jurisdiction would occur if Brunei followed all of the 
other ASEAN states by adopting the 320-kilometer (200-mile) Exclusive 
Economic Zone adjacent to its territorial sea. Brunei then would overlap 
with the other disputants in the South China Sea area. 
Brunei's independence and ASEAN membership will undoubtedly have 
consequences for its internal politics. The state is an absolute monarchy with 
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power tightly held by the royal family. In many respects Brunei's govern- 
ment is more like that of a Persian Gulf than a Southeast Asian state. The 
state of emergency continues. The Legislative Council is nominated. Internal 
security has high police priority. Although the Sultan has become much 
more visible in the past two years as a reigning, modernizing monarch, it 
remains to be seen whether the kinds of political pressures for popular access 
to power, represented, for example, by the PRB, can be indefinitely resisted. 
There are two thousand or more Bruneians studying abroad. The non-royals 
are the great majority among them, and a rising political consciousness will 
be carried back to Brunei. Almost in anticipation of challenge, a new Inter- 
nal Security Act has been promulgated that provides for preventive deten- 
tion for two years renewable at the pleasure of the Sultan and not subject to 
appeal to any court. 
Brunei's ASEAN membership will have certain consequences for the As- 
sociation itself. In the first place, it will solidify the Malay-Indonesian cultur- 
al heart of ASEAN. Second, it will change Singapore's status as ASEAN's 
"mini-state." ASEAN's procedural pattern of site rotation of important com- 
mittees may have to be altered given expected staffing problems in Brunei. 
Many of the administrative and technical aspects of ASEAN participation by 
Brunei will be solved on an ad hoc basis. This may be another argument in 
favor of ASEAN's structural flexibility. 
Brunei is becoming independent in a Southeast Asia that continues to be 
an area of local- and great-power conflict. The process of integrating Brunei 
into ASEAN is taking place simultaneously with the ASEAN-Indochina 
confrontation. It is at this level of extra-ASEAN interaction that the security 
aspects of Brunei's membership in the Association have a regional dimen- 
sion. A vulnerable Brunei will to some extent be insulated from the currents 
of competition through its absorption into the established pattern of 
ASEAN orientations, and its potential for becoming a venue for new con- 
flict will be reduced. There are of course new risks for Brunei, but these 
seem more manageable for a Brunei in ASEAN than a Brunei trying to go it 
alone. 
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